Tragic Accidents in Val d'Isère This Season - January 11 & two others
Since all the victims in this avalanche accident (and the two others this season) spent lots of time in Val d’Isère, it has shaken up a lot of people in the community.
I’ve come across a wide variety of individuals who are affected by the tragedy: the manager of a hotel who was friends with one victim and is close friends with his uncle, the bar owner who is/was good friends with another victim... Indeed many people who didn’t know any of the victims are shocked too - over the last few days.
I’ve felt a veil of sadness over the village. The web of friends and family of the victims of the January 11th accident and the two other accidents expands and reaches out beyond the mountain skyline here in all directions to all who’ve known the victims and to all who pause to empathize - the sadness resonates.
The accident on Tuesday January 11 makes three deadly accidental avalanches this season here in Val d’Isère – six dead. To say that it is a tragedy somehow seems to understate what those close to the victims are feeling. From my point of view, all of us off-piste professionals are feeling tense and sad for those involved and those no longer with us. Continuing with this job sometimes feels strange especially the mornings just after each one of these accidents. But the mountains are our passion, our lives, and off-piste skiing/snowboarding is a big part of it.
As I try to make some sense of these accidents and of my surroundings, I will continue to share my thoughts with you, the HAT audience, on off-piste and avalanche awareness. I strongly believe that by better understanding the phenomena (and perhaps ourselves), we can be better at being safer and having more fun in the mountains. Here in this post I will focus on the three tragic accidents this season. As usual I welcome comments from all of you.
FACTS
First some facts from the information that I have gathered on the avalanche this past Tuesday January 11:
- Altitude of crown/fracture: 2800 metres
- Altitude of debris and resting place of victims: 2100 metres
- Depth of crown/fracture: 80 cm on average
- Snow: dry and cold
- Type of avalanche: slab of new and old snow (collapse on a weak layer of mainly depth hoar and faceted grains)
- Aspect: North
- Slope steepness at crown: approx 33°
- Victims: 4 deceased of 7 in the group
- Avalanche rating of 2 that changed to a 3 during the day, on international scale of 1-5 (For definitions of ratings see http://www.henrysavalanchetalk.com/avalanche-forecasts-danger-rating
*More facts and visuals about the January 11th avalanche accident:
http://www.henrysavalanchetalk.com/4-dead-avalanche-fornet-val-disere
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Here I focus on factors common to each of the three tragic avalanche accidents this season. I propose some advice in CONCLUSIONS below.
Each deadly avalanche accident in Val d’Isère this season and most of the other avalanche accidents had the following elements in common:
- North facing slopes above 2500 metres
- Topography: slopes angles of 30° or above were above, below and to each side
- Avalanche rating of 3
- Little or no skier compaction
- Slab avalanche, dry and cold that slid on a collapsed weak cohesionless layer of mainly depth hoar and faceted grains
- The avalanches didn’t release until at least one person had skied the slope (in one case it was on the 6th or 7th person)
- More than one person caught in the avalanche
- Each group was led by a professional
- The professionals survived
- The victims were regular skiers in Val d’Isère
The off piste conditions were unpredictable in each case; a fact that off piste professionals - pisteurs included - will attest to along with the 100's of tracks on similar slopes that didn't avalanche in the area.
CONCLUSIONS
Each avalanche was triggered on a North-facing slope above 2500 metres on slopes that had little or no skier compaction - no one or very few people had been on the slopes where the accidents occurred with the possible exception of the December 26th accident where a couple dozen people had already been on that part of the slope and hundreds in the general area of the ‘Combe de Signal’, but the release was above the skied area
see: http://www.henrysavalanchetalk.com/bad-accident-yesterday-val-disère-0
The avalanche rating was a 3 in each instance. While there was no significant recent avalanche activity on similar slopes and avalanche control with explosives showed few positive results, the Savoie Avalanche bulletin consistently warned of a weak layer under successive new and old slab layers on the types of slopes where the accidents took place. The absence of significant recent avalanche activity: neither natural, artificial or accidental rendered these warnings of a weak layer to a lower level of concern by most off-piste professionals including myself.
On the group management side of things: each group was led by a professional in and around steep slopes, the avalanches released at least 10 metres above the victims in each case. In each case there was more than one person in the avalanche thus more than one person’s weight loading the slope and more than one person exposed to the danger. The avalanches didn’t release until after the first person had skied a large part of the slope - on the January 11 accident, the avalanche didn’t release until the 6th or 7th person skied it. All the skiers, clients of the professionals, spent quite a few days in Val d’Isère each season – some more than 4 or 5 weeks a season. About half owned property in the village.
ADVICE
Restraint needs to be put into practice by people who want to have fun and be safe off piste
Recent avalanche activity is normally a big clue to avalanche risk. However, the current situation is exceptional in that basic clues like recent avalanche activity are not reliable indicators.
1. LEARN HOW TO HAVE FUN ON LOW ANGLES SLOPES
- Stay on and around slopes of 25° (slope steepness of a red run maximum – see photo ‘Learn how to have fun on low slope angles’) or less especially on North facing slopes above 2200 metres that have not been skied much this season
- After new snowfalls stay at least 200 m to 300 m away from steep slopes above off-piste routes that don't get skied (more distance if the recent snowfalls are close to a metre or more). You can trigger these kinds of slopes from a distance.
- When you are travelling on low angles slopes, watch out for convexities that lead into parts of the itinerary that are steep enough to avalanche. Even on low angle off-piste itineraries, there are always small parts that are steep enough to avalanche.
2. PAY MORE ATTENTION TO THE AVALANCHE FORECAST BULLETINS AND WHAT AVALANCHE CONTROL PROFESSIONALS ARE OBSERVING
I’ve learned that I should be paying closer attention to the avalanche bulletins and what the pisteurs (ski patrol) have to say about what they have seen during avalanche control and apply that more directly to my decision making (where the weak layers are worst, where there are dangerous slabs developing and releasing, where there has been recent avalanche activity and/or where they think that slopes are suspect) etc. I suggest you do the same if and when you consider going on to steeper slopes with fresh snow on them.
3. GO ONE AT A TIME OR KEEP DISTANCES BETWEEN PEOPLE IN THE GROUP AND STOP IN SAFE SPOTS (while on or around ‘steeper slopes’ of 25° steepness or above).
This is another thing that I’m stricter about now – with myself, with my mates and with my paying clients even when the rating is not high and there is little or no recent avalanche activity on similar slopes. I suggest you do the same.
Further related points FOR DISCUSION – Please comment
1. PRESSURE ON THE PROFESSIONAL
People who hire a local off-piste professional, have a very good level of skiing and spend many days in the area in question - a resort like Val d’Isère - are more likely to want to be taken to places far afield, places that they can’t or don’t want to go to just with their mates. In other words, people who know an area very well are not hiring someone to take them to places that they can easily go to with their mates (like the types of low angle places I’m advising people to go to in this blog post). The desire and expectations for untracked snow also motivates all of us to search farther afield. I believe that this influences the dynamics of the group and the decision making process of the professional.
2. ESCAPING A MOVING AVALANCHE
I suspect that the professionals who were caught in these avalanches, and experienced skiers in other accidents, are better able to save themselves compared to people with less skill and experience off-piste because they have the presence of mind and skill needed to get off the slab (or out of the main part of it) quickly enough. Instinctively they were thinking of an escape route. Plus they had the skiing skill level needed in order to get to the edge of the slab (or close enough to it) so that they were able fight to get out of the slab once it had broken up and they were taken in it.
Consistently I’ve seen in case studies and statistics that the better skiers/snowboards seem to escape with fewer injuries than their less competent friends or clients. I believe that this has something to do with it and I’m interested in comments on this.
Henry
*** Additional comment: Contrasts Between The Accidents *** Posted January 17th
After my post where I compared some common elements about the 3 tragic avalanches that have occurred so far this season in Val d’Isère, see the post here
I have explored some contrasting elements as well as comparisons. There are some elements especially in the accident of the 26th December that stand in stark contrast to the two other accidents, especially in group management and choice of slope. I hope also that the following contrasts will answer some of the questions that came up on the blog today like, “It's quite hard to know what lessons are to be learned?” from Ross.
Most importantly I want to make it clear that these avalanches were not, “just bad luck” as some in the media have portrayed. Here are some of the elements that lead us to believe this
In the December 26th accident the group was instructed to keep distances of 50 metres apart and finish in an area protected from avalanches. The victims ended up 3 metres apart on the slope and that extra weight may have triggered the avalanche. But if the skiers had kept 50m apart and still the slope had avalanched, probably only one victim would have been buried. As it happened, two people ended up being taken in the avalanche (due to the fact that they ended up closer together on the slope).
On January 11th all 7 people in the group were taken in the avalanche - due to all being exposed to danger at the same time. There was also an issue of choice of slope that set the December 26th accident in stark contrast to the January 11th accident.
The slope on 26th December was in a lightly skied part of the Coombe du Signal but the slope was not exposed to a big slope and cliffs below. As a result the victims were taken 75 metres. In the Vallonets Jan 11th incident slope was also not skied much before but the victims were taken 800+ metres.
So the consequences of the two avalanches were very different. On 11th January in the Vallonets, 7 people were caught on the slope that was triggered. 7 skiers were taken in the avalanche but 5 went over the cliffs, 4 died. The guide got out after about 150m , and another skiied out as it broke under feet.
There are a few more contrasts that set these avalanches accidents apart, but the main ones are above. Please comment below if you have any other insights or questions.
Finally, experienced off-piste skiers know that avalanches happen in certain places at certain times for certain reasons – they don’t just happen by chance and we can’t put any of these avalanches just down to bad luck. I invite everyone to look at the facts and present them in an objective transparent manner for the benefit of all involved and most importantly for the benefit of the off-piste skiing public, so we can at least try and learn from these tragic events.
On this subject, I have a concern about a Telegraph article covering the accidents in the press: this portrays the incidents as purely bad luck. Please see my comments on the post, "Problems with Peter Hardy article published January 12th" under former discussion "Sharing Information" where you can see the article in question. My specific concerns are expressed on this link: http://www.henrysavalanchetalk.com/sharing-information#comment-229
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Comments
Some thoughts.
Just a few points:
There is excellent Google Earth satellite image coverage for the area where all the avalanches have taken place. If you look at the satellite images it's clear that what they all have in common is that they are all significant rock fall areas stripped bare with errosion. The normal focus may be on the orientation of the slope for sun, wind, temperature reasons, but that might be obscuring some other - literally - underlying factors. I'd post some stored images here but I can't get them uploaded.
The "air bag" survivor from the signal avalanche was however buried face down. This is an issue that has worried me ever since I first saw ABS air bags. If you have ever used a life vest at sea - which I have on several occasions on survival courses - they are designed to keep you face up and for this reason the flotation is on the front not the back. I notice that the SnowPulse air bags are designed with this in mind.
If I was buried even with an air bag I'd want it to be in front of me and to then deflate after five minutes to give me a large breathing space - but I don't know if that's what they are designed to do or not.
I don't think there is any point in owning an air bag unless the owner is trained to actually deploy it and there is no embarrassment at the thought of deploying it unnecessarily. Air bags do seem to be relatively useless where cliffs are involved - but at least the SnowPulse version does seem to offer protection to the head and neck. I'm kind of wondering if this idea could be taken further to protect more of the body directly from shocks.
I'm fairly gadget oriented and computer literate but I can't sort out what is going on with all the latest transceiver technology - what works and what doesn't. There is too much slack here and as we professionals have to all be registered with the Ministry of Sport here in France perhaps we could push them to do something useful for a change and to get this straightened out by putting some government resources into it. The safety equipment is also severely over priced and with today's microchip technology there's no real justification for that.
Airbags and Tranceivers
Some great thoughts skicoach. I have worked in the offshore industry for 19 years and yes all the safety equipment for survival at seas works so your face is up and i must admit the SnowPulse does seem a better option for this and also head protection and the added bonus of possible creating a air space under the snow. But when reading other articales the ABS air bag does advertise that arm movement is not restricted so you can swim in the avalanche. seems like each has its good and bad points.
Tranceivers yes here for a season and only a few have then in the house im in, as yes its the cost factor BUT there are options for a cost effective equipment with Ortovox economy probe and shovel and analogue tranceiver F1. and also Henery doing a good package deal. As i have found out you need to practice alot with the F1 tranceiver as digital ones are easier to use but they do have a smaller range that they cover.
Contrasts Between The Accidents
This is an update to the Vallonets accident review and was posted by Henry on 17th January
After my post where I compared some common elements about the 3 tragic avalanches that have occurred so far this season in Val d’Isère, I have explored some contrasting elements as well as comparisons. There are some elements especially in the accident of the 26th December that stand in stark contrast to the two other accidents, especially in group management and choice of slope. I hope also that the following contrasts will answer some of the questions that came up on the blog today like, “It's quite hard to know what lessons are to be learned?” from Ross.
Most importantly I want to make it clear that these avalanches were not, “just bad luck” as some in the media have portrayed. Here are some of the elements that lead us to believe this
In the December 26th accident the group was instructed to keep distances of 50 metres apart and finish in an area protected from avalanches. The victims ended up 3 metres apart on the slope and that extra weight may have triggered the avalanche. But if the skiers had kept 50m apart and still the slope had avalanched, probably only one victim would have been buried. As it happened, two people ended up being taken in the avalanche (due to the fact that they ended up closer together on the slope).
On January 11th all 7 people in the group were taken in the avalanche - due to all being exposed to danger at the same time. There was also an issue of choice of slope that set the December 26th accident in stark contrast to the January 11th accident.
The slope on 26th December was in a lightly skied part of the Coombe du Signal but the slope was not exposed to a big slope and cliffs below. As a result the victims were taken 75 metres. In the Vallonets Jan 11th incident slope was also not skied much before but the victims were taken 800+ metres.
So the consequences of the two avalanches were very different. On 11th January in the Vallonets, 7 people were caught on the slope that was triggered. 7 skiers were taken in the avalanche but 5 went over the cliffs, 4 died. The guide got out after about 150m , and another skiied out as it broke under feet.
There are a few more contrasts that set these avalanches accidents apart, but the main ones are above. Please comment below if you have any other insights or questions.
Finally, experienced off-piste skiers know that avalanches happen in certain places at certain times for certain reasons – they don’t just happen by chance and we can’t put any of these avalanches just down to bad luck. I invite everyone to look at the facts and present them in an objective transparent manner for the benefit of all involved and most importantly for the benefit of the off-piste skiing public, so we can at least try and learn from these tragic events.
On this subject, I have a concern about a Telegraph article covering the accidents in the press: this portrays the incidents as purely bad luck. Please see my comments on the post, "Problems with Peter Hardy article published January 12th" under former discussion "Sharing Information" where you can see the article in question. My specific concerns are expressed on this link:
http://www.henrysavalanchetalk.com/sharing-information#comment-229
J'étais present Combe du Signal le 26 décembre
Hi Henry.
I look after HAT every days, it is always very interesting…and I always learn something. I agree when you say “contrasts between the accidents “about the 3 last avalanches.
In fact I was the 26th of December in the group with AE in the Combe du Signal.
I can explain what really happens.
But Henry I write in French , it will be easier for me and please translate for me.
Je tiens a témoigner de ce qui est arrivé le 26 décembre dans la Combe du Signal puisque je faisais parti du groupe, juste derrière le guide.
Tous les membres du groupe étaient des clients fidèles et skient avec AE depuis plus de 10 ans et même 15 ou 20 ans pour certains.
Personnellement je skie avec AE depuis 15 ans et plus de 90 jours par hiver les 4 dernières saisons.
Je vais dire l’essentiel de ce qui s’est passé.
Rendez vous à la Gourmandine où les guides vérifient le bon fonctionnement des ARVA, les groupes sont faits, ils ont décidés ensemble du programme de la matinée sans en donner le résultat, en fait ils se gardent la possibilité de changer d’avis en fonction des circonstances.
Il est donc décidé d’aller vers le Fornet, les 3 groupes partent sur le même secteur, nous prenons le téléphérique, le Signal express puis le téléski du signal.
Au sommet du téléski du Signal notre guide donne la consigne : « distance 50 m »
Dans la traversée je suis derrière le guide, je laisse la distance demandée, et même un peu plus.
A milieu de la traversée une dizaine de virages dans la ligne de pente sont faits pour perdre un peu d’altitude et la traversée se poursuit sans arrêt.
Je rejoins le guide sous un rocher juste avant la pente convoitée…je me retourne et vois que les distances sont largement respectées.
Le guide fait la trace par des virages sérés dans la ligne de pente comme nous le faisons habituellement : je vois que la neige est belle.
Lorsque le guide est sur la gauche de la pente il lève son bâton et je m’élance emboitant mes traces à celle du guide, c’est la règle pour permettre aux skieurs suivants d’avoir une belle poudreuse vierge .
Arrivé en bas à coté du guide il me dit d’avancer, je m’exécute, et me retourne 3 ou 4 secondes après…je n’ai entendu aucun bruit, mais devine une avalanche et je vois l’orange d’un airbag en train de s’immobiliser en léger contrebas …ceci me rassure et je suis confiant.
Je vois Wayne se précipiter pour secourir.
Je fais une conversion, le guide me fait signe et j’arrive immédiatement.
Il vient de dégager le visage de Chrissy et me dit de poursuivre, j’éteins mon ARVA, je retire mon sac, je retire mes gants , je monte ma pelle et commence à la dégager ,c’est à ce moment là que je réalise que David est sous la neige, Chrissy est sur le ventre, elle a toujours ses skis aux pieds, elle est coincée , et l’accès a son ARVA en est compliqué , il me faut son aide pour extraire son ARVA puis l’éteindre il aura fallu 2 ou 3 minutes , ce qui est long mais le temps passe très vite.
Je me concentre sur ce que j’ai à faire,la pelle est petite, je la dégage et je réussis à faire sauter une fixation, je dégage l’autre chaussure mais je suis incapable de poursuivre j’ai les mains gelées, j’aurais du remettre mes gants avant de commencer, John qui faisait parti du 3eme groupe arrive et prend mon relai.
Les secours arrivent pour prendre la relève.
Une secouriste veut vérifier que mon ARVA et celui de Chrissy sont à l’arrêt, ce qui était le cas…
David qui se trouve à 3 m sous 1 m de neige est dégagé rapidement avec les pelles des secouristes…Un gros travail de réanimation est déclenché, David a du rester 20 mn sous la neige, le médecin arrive en hélicoptère, on nous demande de partir.
L’émotion est à son maximum. Nous partons.
Chrissy a tiré sur la poignée de son Airbag elle en est sortie indemne physiquement, David n’a pas tiré, il a perdu la vie, nous skiions depuis près de 10 ans ensemble hors piste et faisions partis « des trois mousquetaires » comme il aimait à le rappeler souvent…c’est une grande tristesse.
Conclusion.
Respecter les consignes données par le guide: distance, un par un, ilots de sécurité, observer les autres skier, ne pas les quitter des yeux…
Apprendre à tirer la poignée de son Airbag, pour cela il existe une poignée rouge pour s’exercer sans déclencher.
Installer et désinstaller le plus souvent possible sa poignée pour penser à la tirer si nécessaire.
Depuis ce jour néfaste le lech qui permet de ne pas perdre ma poignée est accroché en travers entre les deux bretelles de mon sac à dos pour augmenter les chances de déclanchement si nécessaire …
Je n’ai pas skié le jour suivant l’accident car atteint moralement, j’ai skié avec AE tous les jours depuis.
En skiant je pense tous les matins à David qui nous manque à tous.
http://picasaweb.google.com/jean.ribart
Translation of Jean Ribart post
Thank you to Richard Humphreys for this translation. Richard was also present at the time of the accident.
I can describe what happened on the 26th December in the Combe du Signal as I was a member of the group, skiing first behind the guide.
All the members of the group were long-standing clients of AE: all for 10 years and some 15-20 years. Personally, I’ve been skiing with AE for 15 years, and for the last 4 seasons, over 90 days/season.
I would like to describe the essentials of what happened.
We met at the Gourmandine where the guides checked our beepers, and they confirmed which group we were in. They decided between themselves where we were going for the morning, without telling us the plan: they were allowing themselves the option to change the plan depending on circumstances.
They decided to go to the Fornet. The 3 groups went to the same sector. We took the cable-car, the Pyramides chair, and then the Signal poma.
At the top of the poma, our guide told us to leave 50m gaps between skiers.
On the traverse, I was behind the guide leaving a 50m gap or more.
At the middle of the traverse we did about 10 turns down the fall line to lose a bit of height, and then we carried on traversing without stopping.
I caught up with the guide under a rock just before the coveted slope looked round and saw that the group’s spacing was pretty much correct.
The guide made a track of linked turns in the fall line, as usual: the snow looked good.
When the guide got to the left side of the slope, he waved his stick and I skied down, putting my tracks next to his, as we always do so as to allow the following skiers the maximum amount of good fresh powder.
When I got down next to the guide he told me to move forward, which I did, and I turned round 3-4 seconds later…I didn’t hear anything, but guessed an avalanche, and I saw the orange colour of an airbag stopping a little lower.. This reassured me and I was hopeful.
I saw Wayne ski fast to the rescue.
I did a kick turn, the guide signalled me down, and I skied down immediately.
He’d just cleared the snow from Chrissy’s face and left me to get on with it. I turned off my beeper, took my backpack off, took off my gloves, put together my shovel and started to dig her out. That was when I realised that David was buried under the snow. Chrissy was lying on her front, she still had her skis attached to her feet, she was pretty stuck, and it wasn’t easy to get to her beeper to turn it off. I needed her help to do this and it must have taken 2 or 3 minutes: that’s a long time, but time passes very quickly.
I concentrated on what I had to do. The shovel was small. I got her dug out and managed to release one of her bindings, but I couldn’t carry on: my hands were frozen, and I would have to put my gloves back on before continuing . John who was in the 3rd group arrived to take over.
A pisteur wanted to check that my beeper and Chrissy’s were switched off, which they were.
David was about 3m away from Chrissy under 1m of snow. He was [found by Wayne- my addition] and then quickly dug out by the big shovels of the pisteurs. They worked hard to resuscitate him, but he had been buried for 20 minutes or so. The doctor arrived. We were asked to leave.
The emotion was very high. We left.
Chrissy had pulled the handle of her airbag, and walked away unscathed physically. David didn’t pull his, and he lost his life. We’ve been skiing together for about 10 years and felt like “three musketeers”, as he like to say. It’s a great sadness.
Conclusion
Obey the guide’s instructions: distance, one at a time, islands of safety, watch the other skiers, don’t stop looking. Learn to pull the handle of your airbag. There’s a red handle that you can use for practice that won’t set off the bag. Put in and remove your handle as often as possible, so that you are used to thinking about pulling it if it’s necessary.
Since this day I will start using a strap between my handle and the other side of the back pack, as this will give me a better chance of finding it .I didn’t ski the day after the accident…., but I’ve skied with AE every day since. Every morning when we’re skiing, I think of how much we all miss David.
Jean Ribart's Post
Can someone translate this into English please?
The chattering classes
Henry
Although I'm not in Val yet this season I have been following this with interest.
I believe these days that around 100 people die in avalanche related accidents in the Alps each year. Compared to the millions of ski days taken we must therefore put this into relative context.
If we look at other open environment activities I believe off piste is no worse than any of them.
How many people die in the sea whilst swimming, sailing, diving etc in European waters every year?
How many motorcycists die in the UK alone due to wrong analysis / unlucky (diesel on road at a bend) situations?
How many walkers die in European mountains simply getting lost and freezing to death or falling off paths with drop offs?
How many horse riders die after falls etc?
Take on the sport - accept the risk. Minimise it through education, experience, knowledge. Add the small amount of good luck needed, go out and enjoy the day and accept the reasonable, minimised risk you have created in order to do it.
Your points above Henry are very valid. Basics like if depth hoar has formed early in the season then beware north, north west / north east facing slopes and assume a tight slab on ball bearings is present, just in case. lower slope angles, time of day etc etc.
The fact the recent episodes were led by very highly experienced professionals shows how any one can get caught, that minute element of luck has to surface when you spend every working day off piste.
In my experience (I haven't caused or been in an avalanche) when something has gone wrong, it has involved less experienced skiers doing things obviously wrong in the group or ignoring instructions from the leader and been a culmination of 2 or more small things.
I remember skiing with 4 skiers after a reasonable snowfall near Banane. I told them to wait where they were whilst I looked ahead. I gently slid forward to look / feel the snow near a convex roll. All good, but I instinctively knew by the look / feel of it that We were not going near that pitch and would take the gentler 'safe' slope near the side. Just as I started to turn to walk the skiis back to the small group the snow pack 'woomphed' and sank. good job I had stayed safe away from the roll. As I turned one of the group had slid virtually next to me, overweighted the slope and caused the slab to drop in situ. She skied off piste regularly and should have known better. She was told to wait but ignored it. Had I been nearer the edge it could have ended in tears. 1 thing wrong - we walked away. Nearer the edge = 2 things wrong would have equaled disaster.
Then she had the nerve to ignore me for six months in resort and told her friends I was dangerous!
A little knowledge is a bad thing etc.
So to something I always say after an avalanche catches someone.
everyone is an expert in the bar after the event. I say to people;
"Were you at the top of the pitch with the group looking and taking it in?
Were you party to the chat / discussion about it up there?
Did you hear the reasoning for going ahead?
Did you have that gut feeling of yes or no to the pitch / snow?"
If you wern't there you couldn't have, so better not to criticise.
I feel that Val has now crossed a threshold. So many people skiing off piste. On a new snow day many are now left with the choice of skiing slopes before they have transformed or missing out because if they don't do it there and then, 100 others surely will that morning leaving nothing.
This puts pressure on professionals to go further afield to avoid the scrum. Now the masses are going further afield too early in the cycle. So the knowledgeable move even further or are left with runs they might not rather have to do. I don't know what the answer is but it's making me fall out of love with Val.
I am particularly warmed that you don't tell people to not go off piste. There are ALWAYS safe pitches even in heavy snow falls. It's just 90% of people don't have the local knowledge to stay safe at these times.
God knows how the two guides feel. I just really hope they don't blame themselves and can move forward.
My heart goes out to all who are suffering terrible losses after these events and to the survivors left with grief and perhaps (unfounded) guilt. I send you all my best heartfelt wishes.
Lets hope there aren't knee jerk reactions from the authorities closing the mountain down every time there's a small snow fall.
See you all towards the end of the season.
Peter Dewison.
Jan 11
Henry,
Thanks for your thoughts and comments which are very helpful.
These terrible accidents do cause me to reflect very carefully what we do off piste and I'm very moved when I think of all the poor people involved. My deepest thoughts are with you all, as you no doubt wonder whether it could possibly have had a different outcome.
For my part, I'm conscious more than ever, that I need to improve my knowledge and whole approach. I hope it's not disrespectful to ask that the 5 skiers who had descended, following the guide, stopped in the same spot.
The avalanche which seems to have been triggered above them by the 6th skier broke you mention 10 m above them. In the case of a slab-avalanche does this mean that at the very second that the fracture occurs 10 m above, perhaps a split second later the very ground that the 5 are standing on, breaks up and moves too, ie the whole slope slides off at the same time? Do you think that the professional was able to move to safety fractionally ahead of the others or was stronger to force a passage through the churning snow and ice.
Do you think that the 5 skiers' passages weaken the whole slope from top to bottom (so it's ready to unzip) as they descend or is it the fact that they all set off from the same start point that causes it to fracture at that point?
It's quite hard to know what lessons are to be learned? But I'm wondering where the safest point is to stop when there is a skier still above waiting to descend.
Yours respectfully,
Ross Bridger
Slab Behavior
Hi Ross, i would like to clarify some points for you concerning slab avalanches. Firstly, i don't know the exact circumstances of the group positioning so i cannot comment with certainty for your first question. Knowing the guide personally, he would not have regrouped the five skiers you mentioned altogether in an exposed position. The only time a pro guide would do this is on or under an island of safety. According to Henry's description, the avalanche was very large and caught everyone that was on it even skiing a respectable distance from each other.
To give you some information on slab avalanche behavior, it should be known that once triggered, the propagation is lightning fast. It does not "release' as one fracture line,more like top, bottom, left and right at the same time. it is a sudden collapse of the cohesive layers onto the fragile layer lying below. These slabs can be of differing dimensions; say from a few square metres to a slab that might be the size of a football field or more. Regardless of sizes, their behavior is exactly the same. Yes, this means that in an example of say, 2 skiers 50 meters apart on the same slab, then they will both feel the snow move under their feet just like if someone pulled the carpet out from under them at exactly the same time. This is instant. The distinction here is getting caught in the slab verses getting caught in the runout that is produced as a result of the mass of snow now in movement and gathering momentum.
To have a go at your next question, it is so important to understand the potential in overloading a slope. Henry mentions this often with his examples of weight distribution.
eg: 3 skiers at say 240 kg is adding more pressure to the slope (release threshold) than say a lone skier at 80 kg. There is the reason why etiquette in progression is so important. However, one last point on this; it is also very important to understand that even respecting safe distances, each individual passage has the potential to further weaken (not release)an existing fragile layer. This is a bit like the adage ' The straw that broke the camels back'. This explains why in this case the release occurred after the 6th or 7th skier.
In my job as Assistant Ski Patrol Director here in Valfréjus, i consistently conduct safety briefings to the avalanche control team(Ski Patrol). They are all highly skilled pros but i constantly remind them of safety procedure. Islands of safety are gospel to us. we watch each other like eagles. We try and get a feel of what is going on under our feet. We try and get a whiff of what is going on in our surroundings. I will always tell them, if something does not feel right, get the hell outta there, (and prefer to close the ski run below as a consequence). With your concerns about 'the safest point to stop', my answer is that you should have already made that decision at the the top of the descent before plunging into the bowl. Discuss with your skier buddies of your intention. Communication is primordial. Tell them something like: "i will ski down to below that rocky outcrop and will stop. do not move until i give you the signal. watch me all the way down. Rock,n Roll baby, lets go!!" Just remember, if you have a doubt before committing to the slope, then get the hell outta there. This is often ignored on the rush to be 'first in' to claim boasting rights that you laid the first tracks. Don't do it! Also be watching out for other groups/skiers above or around you. Dont get avalanched by ignoring what others are doing around you.
It is really all quite simple actually, everybody just needs to adhere to the same rules. The reality is that they don't.
I have added a link to a youtube video showing a slab releasing under the skiers feet in real time. Just notice how everything starts to move in the blink of an eyelid, above AND below the skier.
I hope this helps.
Lou
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v2DKfv54hIk
Another video: Tignes 18th Dec.
See also this POV footage of an avalanche by the Aiguille Percee in Tignes on 18th December 2010, by a friend and his buddy (not to be emulated), who were extremely lucky not to be fully buried and/or hurt and were able to take it as a shocking lesson. As far as I can see, the avalanche hasn't yet been officially recorded by ANENA.
http://www.kingsurf.co.uk/scuba-and-pete-get-caught-in-a-avalanche-in-th...
Henry, First, I would like to
Henry,
First, I would like to second the sentiments expressed by Ross.
I also eagerly follow your site to reduce my ignorance on avalanches. Therefore I would like to add a few questions.
You mentioned as a common element 'little or no skier compaction'. I would like to get a better feeling what that means. For instance, would you consider the skier impaction in the area of the couloirs of the Chardonnet similar or higher? Other definitions you would consider?
Another question relates to the safety gear. I read somewhere else that one of the victims would have carried an ABS airbag (or equivalent equipment). Was this the case? And if so, is it known if it inflated or not, and why not?
Many thanks.
Kind regards,
Eric
Skier Compaction Definition
hi Eric, I would like to answer your question regarding the definition of 'Skier Compaction'. A good way to explain this is to give you the example with a snowcat machine as a metaphor. A snowcats' role is primarily to produce a first class, quality skiing surface as you already know.However, aside from other tasks such as pushing snow around & ironing out the bumps etc...it has a very important role in "hard packing" the snow to help maintain & preserve the ski surface. Essentially, what is going on during this process is the destruction of the fragile crystals that exist, notably, fresh snow after a snowfall. By eliminating this fragility, compacting the snow & squeezing out all the air content, we end up with a dense, stable, compact skiable ski surface, that we find every morning after slope grooming.
So getting back to off-piste. Each pass of an off piste skier will have a similar effect on the snow surface, albeit on a much smaller scale, but in principal has the same effect as a snowcat machine as described above. Hence, 'skier compaction' helps to stabilize a slope by having the same dynamics at play. Compacting the snow, creating a more dense layer, destroying little by little the fragile crystals ( not depth hoar in this case but rather the fresh snowflakes on the surface) So when Henry talks about 'Little or No Skier Compaction', he is saying that the slope is pretty much in its natural, untouched state. No one or very few have been there. Contrary to this, some off piste itineraries are heavily compacted by skiers. A good example of this is "l'envers du Cugnai". A very busy off piste itinerary so popular that due to skier compaction, there is even a minefield of bumps that form in there. Having explained all this, just one important point to remember. Do not ever conclude that due to skier compaction, an off piste run is now deemed to be safe, secure & stable. This is never the case & is not the message i am trying to convey. Snow grooming will treat the snow on ski runs from the first fall of the season. Fragile layers are eliminated down to the ground. Off piste skier compaction only deal with superficial layers, depth hoar hiding beneath will continue to exist. Please understand this important distinction.
Skier compaction will "help" to stabilize a slope.......a lot different to completely stabilizing a slope. HAT make mention of this in their Avalanche Awareness presentations -:
Don't Follow Tracks
Tracks does not mean it is safe.
As for the second question, I will let Henry answer that one as he is certainly more switched on with the subject than I am.
Hope this helps Eric,
Ride Hard, Ride Safe everyone,
Cheers
Lou
Adjoint Directeur Service des Pistes - Valfréjus
Henry: VMT for your
Henry: VMT for your analysis. I have little to add except that I can confirm that there was little skier compaction. I skied just about exactly the same route with 3 friends a few days before and we were almost the first down. Perhaps we were lucky but we were well spread out and never grouped until the bottom. However, it has always been my thought that this area was quite safe as it is not called 'the Rock Garden' (or is that my name for it?) for nothing as has lots of rocks for the snow pack to bind to. But as I assume that the break started about 10m above where they would have traveresed in (the left saddle from Valonnet I assume) it is clearly less held there and, as you say is steeper. However, will now be more cautious.
I agree about escape routes: on a traverse or when waiting my posture is always ready to go and I am continually updating my escape route so, hopefully, I would react instantly: but ........